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ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Irwin v. Department of Veteran’s Affairs 
sparked a shift in sovereign immunity jurisprudence. As a result, the canon of strict con-
struction is no longer the preeminent tool for restricting the scope of sovereign immunity 
waivers. In a contemporaneous development, the Court began to approach procedural 
rules associated with waivers of sovereign immunity as less absolute, instead applying 
them similarly to those against private individuals. This juxtaposition suggests the need 
for a reexamination of certain statutes. Prior to these two developments, appellate courts 
and commentators rejected the argument that the Federal Tort Claims Act’s (“FTCA”) 
statute of limitation was subject to equitable tolling. The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in 
Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe embraced the Supreme Court’s new jurisdictional framework 
and rejected those earlier positions. Concurring and dissenting opinions refused to accept 
the Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity and procedural limitations zeitgeist. The discord 
suggests that these concurrent shifts have yet to achieve a harmonious whole. This article 
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aims to navigate the waters. Standing on the shoulders of the majority’s opinion while also 
placing the crux of the court’s argument in the context of the Supreme Court’s modern 
precedents, it attempts to shed light on the superiority of the argument that equitable toll-
ing is entirely compatible with the FTCA. In so doing, this article primarily extrapolates 
from the statute’s text meanwhile questioning the notion that the FTCA’s legislative and 
statutory history indicates a contrary intent. 
 
“Perchance hee for whom this Bell tolls may be so ill, as that he knowes not it tolls 
for him; And perhance I may thinke my selfe so much better than I am, as that they who 
are about mee, and see my state, may have caused it to toll for me, and I know not that.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than two decades ago, the Supreme Court’s decision in Irwin v. Department of 
Veteran’s Affairs brought about a drastic shift in waiver of sovereign immunity jurispru-
dence.2 The Court held that there is a rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling applies 
to suits against the government in the same manner as in suits against private individuals.3 
Subsequently, the Court solidified Irwin by moving away from its traditional sovereign 
immunity approach.4 Simultaneously, the Court’s jurisprudence regarding associated pro-
cedural rules, such as statutes of limitations applicable to government defendants, fluctu-
ated considerably.5 Due to these concurrent shifts, appellate and district courts struggled 
with the question of whether equitable tolling is applicable to the limitations provision of 
the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), the preeminent means of redress for people injured 
by the negligence of federal government employees.6 
The Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in John R. Sand & Gravel Company v. United 
States7 juxtaposed these two waves of change and reemphasized the need to examine 
whether a limitations provision is properly “jurisdictional” or not, as a prerequisite to the 
application of equitable tolling.8 In the wake of John R. Sand, the Court attempted to clarify 
its approach to the jurisdictional issue by providing more accuracy and predictability to its 
use of the jurisdictional term.9 Interestingly enough, these cases neither solved the issue 
                                                          
 1. JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS, Meditation XVII 86 (1623) (Anthony Raspa, 
ed. 1975). The number of claims filed each year under the FTCA—and the aggregate dollar amount of those 
claims—leaves no doubt as to the potential impact of applying equitable tolling. See GREGORY SISK, LITIGATION 
WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT § 3.02, at 104 (4th ed. 2006) (noting the “billions of dollars in claims made 
against the United States each year . . . .”). 
 2. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990). 
 3. Id. at 95-96.  
 4. See Franconia Assoc. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129 (2002); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 
(2004); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008).  
 5. See, e.g., Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 
648 (2012); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
 6. Compare Estate of George v. Veteran’s Admin. Med. Ctr., 821 F. Supp. 2d 573 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding 
that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional and therefore is not subject to equitable tolling) with Sublet v. United 
States, No. 2:08 CV 1410, 2010 WL 3419422, at *3 (W.D. LA. Aug. 25, 2010) (“Equitable considerations that 
normally have the effect of tolling ‘are not given that effect when the claim is under the [FTCA].’”) (quoting 
Childers v. United States, 442 F.2d 1299, 1303 (5th Cir. 1971)).  
 7. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. 130. 
 8. Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 50 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 517, 545 (2008) (noting “[b]ecause the United States may not be sued without its consent, the existence 
of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity is necessarily a jurisdictional inquiry”).  
 9. See, e.g., Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817; Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 648; Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 
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nor compelled the circuit courts to abide by any single interpretation—resulting in the cur-
rent circuit split.10 Much of the disagreement is due to the fact that appellate courts largely 
misunderstood or ignored the Supreme Court’s more liberal approach to sovereign immun-
ity and increasingly narrow use of the jurisdictional label.11 
The Ninth Circuit recently addressed this complicated issue in Kwai Fun Wong v. 
Beebe, albeit with great difficulty.12 In Kwai, the court overruled its longstanding precedent 
holding that the limitations provision of the FTCA was strictly jurisdictional and therefore 
not subject to equitable tolling principles.13 However, both the Kwai majority and two dis-
sents strained to reach their foregone conclusions.14 This was not surprising given the lack 
of specific guidance by the Supreme Court in John R. Sand and later cases.15 Coupled with 
a dearth of commentary addressing the issue in recent years, a comprehensive analysis of 
the FTCA’s limitations provision is overdue.16 
This note attempts to answer the threshold17 procedural question of whether the two-
year limitations provision contained in section 2401(b) of the FTCA is jurisdictional and 
argues that the Supreme Court’s recent case law compels the conclusion that it is no more 
than an ordinary statute of limitations to which a presumption of equitable tolling applies. 
Part II discusses the issue in its jurisprudential context vis-à-vis Irwin and the Court’s 
growing dissatisfaction with the strict construction canon traditionally applied sovereign 
immunity waivers.18 Part III provides a working foundation of the Court’s more structured 
jurisdictional analysis—a primarily textualist framework.19 Part IV briefly analyzes the 
competing positions among the circuit courts.20 Part V analyzes Previous Supreme Court 
                                                          
1202. 
 10. See, e.g., Phillips v. Generations Family Health Ctr., 723 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013); Goldblatt v. Nat’l 
Credit Union Admin., No. 11-4307-cv 2012, WL 5458082, at *55 (2d Cir. Nov. 9, 2012) (noting that “in this 
Circuit, it is an open question whether equitable tolling is available for tort claims brought pursuant to the 
FTCA”); Bazzo v. United States, 494 Fed. App'x 545, 546 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[t]he question whether § 2401(b)’s 
exhaustion provisions constitute jurisdictional requirements divides circuit courts and even prompts inconsistent 
rulings within this circuit”).  
 11. See e.g., In re FEMA Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 646 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2011).  
 12. Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 13. Id. at 1045-54; June v. United States, 2013 WL 6773664 (9th Cir. Dec. 24, 2013).  
 14. See generally Kwai, 732 F.3d 1030.  
 15. Id. at 1045 (noting “there is no Supreme Court precedent on the question.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Max Compton, Note, Under John R. Sand & Gravel Co., May Lower Courts Apply Their Own 
Precedent in Determining Whether A Statute Waiving Sovereign Immunity is Jurisdictional?, 29 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 583 (2013). Initial scholarship on this issue predominately sought to address the question of whether Irwin’s 
presumption was rebutted by the FTCA’s legislative history. That discussion is both outside the scope of this 
article and is thoroughly saturated, however, a number of the propositions relevant to that second step in the 
analytical framework are relevant to this discussion. See Ugo Colella & Adam Bain, Revisiting Equitable Tolling 
and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Putting Legislative History in Proper Perspective, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 174 
(2000); Richard Parker & Ugo Colella, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort Claims Act: The Impact 
of Brockamp and Beggerly, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 885 (1999); Richard Parker, Is The Doctrine Of Equitable 
Tolling Applicable To The Limitations Periods In The Federal Tort Claims Act?, 135 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1992).  
 17. The second step in the analytical framework on this issue is whether the presumption set forth in Irwin is 
rebutted due to its inconsistency with the statute’s text. Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49-50 (2002) (“It is 
hornbook law that limitations periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling . . . unless tolling would be 
inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute . . . . Congress must be presumed to draft limitations periods in 
light of this background principle.”) (internal citations omitted). There exists some analytical overlap between 
the two steps. As previously discussed, extensive commentary, and multiple cases provide insight into that step 
in the analytical framework. See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38 (1998); United States v. Brockcamp, 519 
U.S. 347 (1997); see supra note 16.  
 18. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990).  
 19. See, e.g., Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013).  
 20. Compare Santos ex rel. Beatos v. United States, 559 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2011) with In re FEMA Trailer 
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interpretations of related FTCA provisions.21 Part VI argues that strong textual and teleo-
logical considerations offer persuasive evidence that section 2401(b) is, and was always 
meant to be, no more than an ordinary statute of limitations.22 Finally, Part VIII offers 
conclusions and sets forth some basic implications of adopting this approach as standard 
procedure for suits brought pursuant to the FTCA.23 
II.   AN EVOLVING WAIVER 
A. The FTCA: Purpose and History 
The FTCA is a congressional waiver of sovereign immunity, which allows financial 
compensation for torts caused by government employees committed within the scope of 
their employment.24 The general purpose in enacting the FCTA was to treat individuals 
harmed by government employees similar to victims of torts committed by private citi-
zens.25 The Act itself did not seek to create any new causes of action, but instead attempted 
to “build upon the legal relationships formulated and characterized by the states.”26 Con-
gress enacted the FTCA in 1946 after extensive congressional deliberation in response to 
growing concerns regarding the inability of injured individuals to recover from the federal 
government for tortious wrongs committed by its employees.27 As such, Congress’s objec-
tive was to balance individuals’ private interests in resolving their tort claims and the pub-
lic interest in not over-burdening either the legislature, via private bills, or the judicial 
systems, through an exorbitant amount of litigation.28 
As a waiver of sovereign immunity, the FTCA states that courts must treat the gov-
ernment “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual.”29 Federal 
district courts maintain exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to the FTCA.30 
The centerpiece of the ensuing analysis is the limitations provision of the Act, section 
2401(b), which provides: 
 
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is 
presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years 
                                                          
Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 646 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2011).  
 21. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979).  
 22. Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).  
 23. See, e.g., Adam Bain & Ugo Colella, Interpreting Federal Statutes of Limitations, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
493 (2004).  
 24. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-72, 2674-80, 1346, 1402 (2012).  
 25. SISK, supra note 1, at 104-05.  
 26. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).  
 27. SISK, supra note 1, at 103.  
 28. Id.  
 29. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012).  
 30. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012):  
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the 
United States District Court for the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for 
money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or 
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under 
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant 
in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 
Id.  
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 50 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss1/9
2014] WAVES OF CHANGE TOWARDS A MORE UNIFIED APPROACH 275 
after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after 
the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final de-
nial of the claim by the agency to which it is presented.31 
 
Originally, the limitations provision required that the claimant must file suit in the proper 
federal district court within one year of the claim’s accrual.32 Additionally, it did not re-
quire that the claimant file his or her case with the appropriate federal agency prior to filing 
suit in district court.33 However, in 1948, Congress reorganized the FTCA under Title 28.34 
The limitations provision in particular failed to receive much attention during that pro-
cess.35 However, the recodification separated the FTCA’s jurisdictional provision36 from 
its limitations provision.37 
In 1949, Congress modified the limitation provision and gave claimants two years 
from the date of the accrual of their claim to file suit.38 Thereafter, the limitations provision 
underwent numerous revisions over the course of many decades.39 In 1966, Congress 
passed a modification to the law that required the claimant to first file their claim with the 
proper administrative agency.40 The purpose for this modification was to give the appro-
priate agency time to contemplate settlement without recourse to litigation.41 Additionally, 
in 1988, Congress specifically inserted a tolling provision for erroneous omissions of the 
government as the proper defendant.42 At no time did Congress enact any other tolling 
provision within the FTCA and it does not contain any other such provision to this very 
day.43 As a result of the FTCA’s age and extensive modifications, gleaning the proper in-
tent from the legislative history is a difficult task, one that is normally delegated to the 
judiciary.44 
B. Irwin and Shifting Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence 
The present lack of cohesion among the circuit courts came about largely on the 
heels of the Supreme Court decision in Irwin v. Department of Veteran’s Affairs.45 Prior to 
Irwin, federal courts consistently and unanimously held that equitable tolling did not apply 
to the FTCA because section 2401(b)’s two-year limitations provision was a jurisdictional 
                                                          
 31. Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 5(g)(8), 124 Stat. 3848 (2011).  
 32. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601 (“1946 Act”), tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).  
 33. Id.  
 34. See Pub. L. No. 80-773 (“1948 Act”), § 1, 62 Stat. 869 (1948); Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 
1056 (9th Cir. 2013) (Tashima, Circuit Justice, dissenting).  
 35. Kent Sinclair & Charles A. Szypszak, Limitations of Action Under the FTCA: A Synthesis and Proposal, 
28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 6 (1991). 
 36. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1996).  
 37. Kwai, 732 F.3d at 1056 (Tashima, Circuit Justice, dissenting).  
 38. Colella & Bain, supra note 16, at 178-79.  
 39. Id.  
 40. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 112 n.7 (1993).  
 41. Id. Congress’s goal in this matter has been largely a success. See Jeffrey Axelrad, Federal Tort Claims 
Act Administrative Claims: Better Than Third-Party ADR for Resolving Federal Tort Claims, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1331 (2000).   
 42. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(d)(5)(A)-(B), Pub. L. No. 100-694, §§ 5-6, 102 Stat. 4564 (1988).  
 43. 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (2012).   
 44. Sinclair & Szypszak, supra note 35, at 6.  
 45. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990).  
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bar to untimely claims.46 In the wake of Irwin, federal courts reversed course and immedi-
ately began to apply equitable tolling to FTCA two-year limitation period.47 
In Irwin, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, compared the application of 
equitable tolling in suits against the government to suits against private individuals, and 
concluded that the same rationale applied to both.48 Holding that equitable tolling applied 
to the facts in Irwin,49 the Court stated: 
 
Once Congress has made such a waiver [of sovereign immunity], we 
think that making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against 
the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, 
amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver. Such a 
principle is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative intent as well 
as a practically useful principle of interpretation. We therefore hold that 
the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits 
against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United 
States. Congress, of course, may provide otherwise if it wishes to do 
so.50 
 
Instead of limiting this rule to Title VII, the Court declared, “[w]e think this case affords 
us the opportunity to adopt a more general rule to govern the applicability of equitable 
tolling in suits against the government.”51 Today Irwin remains the general rule on ques-
tions of equitable tolling as applied to federal statutes.52 
Historically speaking, the government benefitted from two strong presumptions 
against a waiver of sovereign immunity.53 One early Supreme Court decision described the 
first presumption, stating that, “the sovereignty of the United States raises a presumption 
against its suability, unless it is clearly shown.”54 Thus, there is a presumption that the 
government has not waived its immunity, rather, it must expressly state the waiver—leav-
ing no room for courts to imply them.55 The second presumption is when the government 
                                                          
 46. See, e.g., Gould v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 742 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) 
(interpreting the two-year limitations period); Berti v. Veterans Admin. Hosp., 860 F.2d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(interpreting the six-month limitations period); Houston v. U.S. Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(commenting on the two-year and six-month limitations period). 
 47. Parker & Colella, supra note 16, at 887-88.   
 48. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95. The statute at issue in Irwin was Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 
253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)).  
 49. The plaintiff, Shirley Irwin, brought her claim for unlawful discharge alleging discrimination based on 
race and disability. The Veteran’s Administration denied her claim and the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission affirmed. A letter indicating the final decision was sent to Irwin and her attorney on March 19, 1987. She 
claimed to have received the letter on April 7. Her attorney received the letter on March 23, but did not learn of 
it until April 10 because he was on vacation at the time. She did not file suit in district court until May 6, 1987, 
more than thirty days after she received the letter. The district court subsequently dismissed the claim as untimely, 
claiming that it lacked jurisdiction. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 90-93.  
 50. Id. at 95-96.  
 51. Id. at 95.  
 52. Id.  
 53. Gregory C. Sisk, Twilight for the Strict Construction of Waivers of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 92 N.C. 
L. REV. 1245, 1249 (2014).   
 54. E. Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686 (1927).  
 55. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95 (“A waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally 
expressed.”) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)). See also Price v. United States, 174 
U.S. 373, 375-76 (1899) (“It is an axiom of our jurisprudence. The Government is not liable to suit unless it 
6
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does expressly state the waiver, the terms of the waiver must “be strictly construed in favor 
of the sovereign.”56 Therefore, the plaintiffs are at a distinct disadvantage regarding 
whether a waiver exists, and if it does, the extent of the waiver’s scope.57 Courts often 
comingle these two presumptions, however, they are properly analyzed as separate and 
distinct, the first determining the need for, but not the impact of, the second.58 
The initial question of whether Congress waived the federal government’s immunity 
is typically an easy one, particularly in light of the substantial number of sovereign im-
munity waivers in force today.59 The FTCA provides a clear answer on this initial ques-
tion.60 It plainly states that the “United States shall be liable . . . for tort claims, in the same 
manner and to the same extent as private individuals.”61 The real issue regarding section 
2401(b), therefore, is the scope of that waiver.62 
The Supreme Court’s approach to the scope of the waiver inquiry fluctuated signif-
icantly after its decision in Irwin.63 After Irwin, the Court encountered challenges to sov-
ereign immunity with increasing frequency.64 Fortunately, a number of those cases specif-
ically addressed limitations provisions.65 Taken together, those cases signaled a shift in the 
Court’s approach and likely foreshadowed their effect on section 2401(b).66 
In the 2002 term, the Supreme Court heard Franconia Associates v. United States.67 
The question in that consolidated case was whether the claim accrual rule under in the 
Tucker Act was subject to the strict construction canon.68 Under section 2501 of the Tucker 
Act, plaintiffs must file their claim within six years of the claim’s accrual.69 The petitioners, 
suing for breach of their loan agreements with the federal government, filed their claims 
nine years after the breach of their loans.70 The petitioners argued that the accrual of their 
claims should follow the common law contract accrual rule.71 The government filed a mo-
tion to dismiss, arguing that the petitioner’s claim was untimely due to the strict construc-
tion rule for waivers of sovereign immunity.72 
The Court ruled for the petitioners, rejecting the government’s argument as “an ‘un-
duly restrictive’ reading of the congressional waiver of sovereign immunity.”73 The Court 
found that such a rigid construction was not “a realistic assessment of legislative intent.”74 
                                                          
consents thereto, and its liability in suit cannot be extended beyond the plain language of the statute authorizing 
it.”).  
 56. McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951).  
 57. Sisk, supra note 53, at 1251.   
 58. Id.  
 59. See e.g., The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491; the Contracts Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-
09 (formerly 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-13); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a)(2), 1369(b).  
 60. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988). 
 61. Id.  
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012).  
 63. Sisk, supra note 53, at 1256.   
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012). 
 67. Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129 (2002). 
 68. Id. at 133.  
 69. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2004). 
 70. Franconia, 536 U.S. at 133. 
 71. Id. at 138.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 145 (quoting Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 479 (1986)).  
 74. Id. (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)).   
7
Damrill: Waves of Change Towards a More Unified Approach: Equitable Tollin
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014
278 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:271 
Consequently, the Court refused to accept that the scope of the section 2501’s waiver was 
subject to strict construction in favor of the government.75 Rather, the Court noted the “un-
exceptional” nature of section 2501, and therefore approached it as if the six-year limita-
tion period applied to private individuals, thereby approving the use of the common law 
accrual rule.76 
Two years later the Court rendered its decision in Scarborough v. Principi.77 The 
petitioner filed an application for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act 
(“EAJA”)78 within the statutorily required thirty days, however, the petitioner failed to 
include a necessary allegation.79 Thus, the issue was whether the petitioner was allowed to 
amend the application outside the thirty-day period.80 The Court ultimately decided that 
the petitioner’s application was amendable outside the thirty-day period because such a 
practice would not create an “unfair imposition” on the government.81 
The intriguing component of Scarborough is the disagreement between Justice Gins-
burg’s majority opinion and Justice Thomas’s dissent.82  Irwin requires the courts to treat 
government statutes of limitations the same as those against private individuals.83 How-
ever, Justice Thomas read Irwin as requiring application of the presumption only when a 
“private-litigation equivalent” exists.84 He agreed with the government’s position that the 
EAJA’s fee-shifting provision85 lacked a private equivalent.86 As such, he concluded that 
Irwin was inapplicable.87 The majority, however, did not believe that Irwin was so lim-
ited.88 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, noted that, “[b]ecause many statutes that 
create claims for relief against the United States or its agencies apply only to Government 
defendants, Irwin’s reasoning would be diminished were it instructive only in situations 
with a readily identifiable private-litigation equivalent.”89 Thus, Scarborough simultane-
ously expanded Irwin by not requiring a private-litigation equivalent to statutes of limita-
tions for government defendants and provided additional evidence of the Court’s aversion 
to the strict construction canon when Congress clearly waives federal sovereign immun-
ity.90 
In John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United Sates, the Court again recognized the prob-
lems resulting from its decision in Irwin nearly two decades earlier and provided further 
                                                          
 75. Franconia, 536 U.S. at 145.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004).  
 78. See Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§ 201-08, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325-30 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982); 28 
U.S.C. § 2412 (1982)).  
 79. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 405.  
 80. Id. at 406.  
 81. Id. at 423.  
 82. See generally id.  
 83. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990).  
 84. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 427 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 85. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1998).  
 86. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 427 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 87. Id. Justice Thomas actually went much further, noting “[t]he Court reaches its holding today by distorting 
the scope of Irwin . . . and thereby eviscerating that case’s doctrinal underpinnings.” Id. at 423-24 (internal citation 
omitted).  
 88. Id. at 422 (majority opinion).  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
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elaboration of its rule.91 In this instance, the Court faced the question of whether the statute 
of limitations was a jurisdictional bar for non-tort money claims against the government 
when determining whether to apply equitable tolling to an untimely claim under the Tucker 
Act.92 Like Scarborough, the majority and the dissent disagreed on the scope of Irwin and 
the general state of the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence.93 The majority refused 
to follow the liberal approach taken in Franconia and Scarborough solely because previ-
ous decisions by the Court treated section 2501 of the Tucker Act as “more absolute” and 
not subject to a waiver.94 Thus, the Court’s affinity for “basic principles of stare decisis” 
outweighed the option to follow its new approach to scope of sovereign immunity analy-
sis.95 
The dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens and Ginsburg fully illuminated the ma-
jority’s aberration from Irwin, Franconia, and Scarborough.96 The dissenters noted the fact 
that the Court’s decisions in Franconia and Scarborough ran contrary to the majority’s 
strict construction of section 2501 of the Tucker Act.97 Indeed, the dissenting justices re-
jected the notion that Irwin left a carve-out for statutes it previously construed under the 
traditional strict construction canon.98 Moreover, the dissenters overtly suggested that the 
majority’s opinion muddied the waters of the Court’s recent jurisprudence instead of con-
tinuing toward its goal of clarifying the law.99 
Justice Ginsburg’s separate dissenting opinion offered a similarly harsh view of the 
majority’s rationale.100 She described the majority’s decision as “damage[ing] the coher-
ence of the law” by “cling[ing] to outworn precedents at odds with later, more enlightened 
decisions.”101 She was convinced that Irwin abrogated the conceptual underpinnings of the 
Court’s previous interpretations of the Tucker Act’s limitations provision specifically, and 
those of other provisions more generally.102 Most importantly, Justice Ginsburg adum-
brated that the Court’s recent decisions, coupled with the majority’s decision, would ulti-
mately make section 2401(b) of the FTCA subject to Irwin’s presumption.103 Arguably, 
John R. Sand would have produced a unanimous opinion had the Court refused to rely on 
its earlier interpretations of section 2501 and instead favored its recent decisions in Fran-
conia and Scarborough.104 
                                                          
 91. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008).   
 92. Id. at 132.  
 93. See generally id.  
 94. Id. at 134. See also Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270 (1957); United States v. Greathouse, 166 U.S. 
601 (1897); De Arnaud v. United States, 151 U.S. 483 (1894). 
 95. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 139.  
 96. Id. at 140-47 (Stevens, J., & Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 97. Id. at 141 n.4.  
 98. Id. at 141-42.  
 99. Id. at 143. They also approvingly quoted the famous passage by Justice Holmes that “[i]t is revolting to 
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more 
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from 
blind imitation of the past.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).  
 100. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 144-47 (Stevens, J., & Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 101. Id. at 144 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. at 145.  
 103. Id. at 145-46 (“While holding that the language in § 2501 is ‘jurisdictional,’ the Court also implies that 
Irwin governs the interpretation of all statutes we have not yet construed—including, presumably, the identically 
worded [28 U.S.C. § 2401].”).  
 104. Sisk, supra note 53, at 1278-79. Justice Frankfurter once lamented that a similar deviation created “a 
derelict on the waters of the law.” Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957).  
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The aforementioned cases provide evidence of the Supreme Court’s departure from 
the strict construction mantra that disfavored plaintiffs for more than a century.105 John R. 
Sand provided the only abnormality to an otherwise succinct animosity towards the canon 
of strict construction.106 Justice Scalia best summarized the rationale: 
 
It has been a corollary of the rule disfavoring waiver of sovereign im-
munity—or was arguably thought to be a part of the rule itself—that 
“limitations and conditions upon which Government consents to be sued 
must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.” 
So, for example, statutes of limitations applicable to suits against the 
government could not be accorded the sorts of equitable tolling that 
would be allowed in private suits. This rigidity made sense when suits 
against the government were disfavored, but not in modern times. It is 
one thing to regard government liability as exceptional enough to require 
clarity of creation as a matter of presumed legislative intent. It is quite 
something else to presume that a legislature that has clearly made the 
determination that government liability is in the interests of justice wants 
to accompany that determination with nit-picking technicalities that 
would not accompany other causes of action.107 
 
By comparison, the Court’s modern approach, as stated by Justice Alito, is that “[t]he sov-
ereign immunity canon is just that—a canon of construction. It is a tool for interpreting the 
law, and we have never held that it displaces the other traditional tools of statutory con-
struction.”108 
In regard to section 2401(b) of the FTCA, the Supreme Court’s lenient approach to 
the core matter of federal waivers of sovereign immunity directly crosses paths with its 
efforts to liberalize its approach to accompanying statutes of limitations.109 The following 
section addresses the Court’s recent stance on the question of whether a statute of limita-
tions applicable to government defendants is of the more absolute type so as to abrogate 
the utilization of Irwin, or is instead a generic limitations provision to which Irwin ap-
plies.110 Analysis of this issue, despite the Court’s more liberal approach to sovereign im-
munity waivers, is still a necessary procedural inquiry.111 The ensuing analysis assumes, 
based on the foregoing discussion, the Supreme Court’s abandonment of—or at least its 
antipathy for—the strict construction canon as applied to the scope of federal sovereign 
                                                          
 105. Sisk, supra note 53, at 1294-95. See also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 284 (2012) (“[T]he rigor with which courts have applied the interpretive rule 
disfavoring waivers of sovereign immunity has abated—rightly so.”).  
 106. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 105, at 286.  
 107. Id. at 285 (internal citations omitted).  
 108. Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 589 (2008). See also Sisk, supra note 53, at 1295 (“At 
most, the strict construction rule appears to have been assigned a supporting player role.”).  
 109. See, e.g., Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013).  
 110. Id.  
 111. Sisk, supra note 8, at 554 (noting “under the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence over the past 
quarter-century, a jurisdictional construction has been maintained for evaluation of the essential character of 
claims for relief that are permitted against the federal government, but procedural requirements have been applied 
in the same manner as among private parties”).  
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immunity waivers112 and instead proceeds from the standpoint that section 2401(b) is sub-
ject commonly accepted canons of statutory construction.113  
III. SOLIDIFYING THE JURISDICTIONAL LABEL 
Ordinarily a statute’s limitation provision is quintessentially a “claim-processing 
rule” to which equitable tolling principles may be applicable.114 Paradoxically, when read 
as jurisdictional, a statue serves to limit the court’s authority to hear any challenge to it.115 
Therefore, a jurisdictional statute is, by definition, not subject to Irwin’s rebuttable pre-
sumption.116 The rationale is that courts “[have] no authority to create equitable exceptions 
to jurisdictional requirements.”117 Consequently, the jurisdictional versus non-jurisdic-
tional question is of critical importance such that the Supreme Court exercises considerable 
restraint in its use of the term.118 
Jurisdiction in this context refers specifically to subject-matter jurisdiction because 
the FTCA establishes the district courts’ ability to hear a certain type of case, namely neg-
ligent torts committed by government employees within the scope of their employment.119 
Since a party may object to subject-matter jurisdiction at any time, a court cannot apply 
                                                          
 112. Despite the observation that the Supreme Court has moved beyond faithful adherence to the strict con-
struction canon, some maintain that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is essential to the separation of powers 
doctrine. Gregory Sisk, The Inevitability of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 55 VILL. L. REV. 899 (2010).  
 113. This assumption may be somewhat premature in the sense that the Court has yet to expressly repudiate 
the strict construction canon. However, some do not think it a stretch, insomuch as the Court’s recent cases 
challenge the canon on a consistent basis. Sisk, supra note 53. See also Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 132 S. 
Ct. 1441 (2012); Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011); United States v. Tohono 
O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011). Additionally, one can argue that this assumption provides little help in 
that it may allow the use of anti-canons to negate the strict construction canon altogether. See e.g., EINER 
ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 195 (2008); Karl Llewel-
lyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Con-
strued, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). However, the assumption is not that other canons need bow to strict 
construction, rather, the assumption is that they now operate on an egalitarian basis in determining the scope of 
a waiver of sovereign immunity.  
 114. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. at 825 (quoting Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 
1197, 1203 (2011)).  
 115. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 991 (4th ed. 1951) (defining “jurisdiction” as “the authority by which 
courts and judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases”) (emphasis added); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1038 (3d ed. 1933) (similarly using the term “cognizance” to define “jurisdiction”); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 136 (2008). In general, if a statute is construed as jurisdictional, plaintiffs are 
typically at a disadvantage because the statue “must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be 
implied.” Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957). See also Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 232-
33 (1887); Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123, 125-26 (1883).  
 116. Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). It has been argued that Irwin 
can be read for the proposition that section 2401(b)’s limitations period may “be both jurisdictional and subject 
to equitable tolling.” Parker & Colella, supra note 16, at 898. However, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has 
yet to accept that statutes of limitations can be both jurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling. Auburn Reg’l 
Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. at 824 (“We reiterate what it would mean were we to type the governing statute . . . juris-
dictional. . . . there be no equitable tolling.”). Therefore, this note assumes the Court’s rejection of such an argu-
ment.  
 117. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). 
 118. Id. at 215-16 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“In recent years, however, we have tried to clean up our language, 
and until today we have been avoiding the erroneous jurisdictional conclusions that flow from indiscriminate use 
of the ambiguous word.”).  
 119. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). Certain other injuries, for example, are 
not covered by the FTCA, including negligent omissions by employees, claims arising in foreign countries, etc. 
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2000).  
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equitable tolling to jurisdictional limitations provisions.120 To allow late jurisdictional ob-
jections would waste judicial resources and disarm litigants that have already conceded to 
the tribunal’s authority to hear the case.121 For this reason, “courts are obligated to consider 
sua sponte” issues pertaining to subject-matter jurisdiction.122 Indeed, as the Court has 
noted, a statutory provision may contain a time limit that is linguistically emphatic and yet 
not jurisdictional.123 
In recent years the Court distinctively narrowed its use of the term “jurisdictional” 
in a manner that exclusively indicated a court’s “adjudicatory authority.”124 Thus, the ju-
risdictional label is relevant to the extent that it “refers [only] to the to the tribunal’s power 
to hear a case.”125 Due to difficulty and significance of this determination, the Supreme 
Court adopted a ‘“readily administrable bright line’ rule for determining whether to clas-
sify a statutory limitation as jurisdictional.”126 Under this bright line test, a court must re-
view the language, context, and relevant historical treatment of a specific statutory provi-
sion when making its determination.127 
Since federal district courts obtained this authority via congressional authorization, 
by implication Congress is free to attach conditions to that jurisdiction as it sees fit.128 Only 
when judicial inquiry provides a clear indication that Congress intended the rule to be ju-
risdictional will the Court so label it.129 The Court has repeatedly refused the notion that 
Congress must provide such an indication via “magic” words.130 As such, the default pre-
sumption in the Court’s jurisdictional analysis is that ordinary filing or claim-processing 
rules are not deserving of the jurisdictional label.131 
All of this is to say that the difference between rules that govern the Court’s ability 
to adjudicate a case and more flexible rules primarily concerned with the prompt presen-
tation of claims is paramount.132 At this point, the vast majority of the Court’s attention 
centers primarily on the textual characteristics of the statutes at hand.133 Although not ex-
pressly declared as such, the jurisdictional inquiry inherently makes use of semantic and 
                                                          
 120. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (“Subject-matter 
jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited.”).  
 121. Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 648 (“[A] valid objection may lead a court midway through the briefing process 
to dismiss a complaint in its entirety. ‘[M]any months of work on the part of the attorneys and the court may be 
wasted.’”) (quoting Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011)).  
 122. Id. See also Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202 (“Courts do not usually raise claims or arguments on their 
own. But federal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their 
jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or 
elect not to press.”); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).  
 123. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004). 
 124. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160 (2010).  
 125. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Re-
gion, 558 U.S. 67, 81 (2009); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) (“[J]urisdictional statutes 
‘speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties.’”) (quoting Republic. Nat’l 
Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 100 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)).  
 126. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013) (quoting Arbough v. Y & H Corp., 546 
U.S. 500, 516 (2006)).  
 127. Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. at 166.  
 128. William James Goodling, Distinct Sources of Law and Distinct Doctrines: Federal Jurisdiction and Pru-
dential Standing, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1157 (2013).  
 129. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. at 824.   
 130. Id.  
 131. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011).   
 132. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004).   
 133. See generally Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817.  
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syntactic canons of construction.134 This development, in accordance with the disinclina-
tion for the strict construction sovereign immunity canon, simultaneously provides clarity 
and flexibility without invading congressional purview.135 
Despite the Court’s attempt at clarity, inter-circuit and intra-circuit splits remain 
prevalent.136 Since the John R. Sand Court neither clearly overruled Irwin or expressly 
affirmed its continued vitality—a failure actually adding to the confusion among circuit 
courts—difficulty characterizing section 2401(b) lingers.137 Instead, the John R Sand 
anomaly was simply the result of a long line of jurisdictional treatment that the Court found 
compelling, despite substantial authority to the contrary.138 It is due to the lack of clarity 
stimulated by John R. Sand that lower courts continue to adhere to pre-Irwin precedents 
that overwhelmingly found that section 2401(b) was jurisdictional.139 However, confusion 
of this sort is unfounded given the Court’s numerous recent decisions holding that filing 
deadlines are ordinarily not jurisdictional.140 As the ensuing sections seek to demonstrate, 
section 2401(b) is not so absolute as to necessitate the jurisdictional label.141 
IV.   CIRCUIT COURT DISARRAY: STATUS REPORT 
A. The Traditional Approach 
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita’s devastating impact on the 
Gulf Coast in 2005, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) provided 
emergency housing units (“EHUs”) to hundreds of victims who lost their homes.142 Little 
did those victims know that the EHUs would emit formaldehyde, causing respiratory and 
asthma problems to numerous occupants.143 Many EHU recipients asked federal authorities 
about the cause of the problem, only to hear that it was “nothing to worry about.”144 After 
more than two years of continued problems, the victims filed a class action lawsuit against 
FEMA and argued that the government’s assurances established proper grounds to equita-
bly toll their claims.145 In 2011, with the fate of thousands of claimants in its hands, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the plaintiffs could not avail themselves of the 
equitable tolling doctrine.146 The court decided that it had no authority to hear the case 
because section 2401(b)’s two-year limitation, as read by the court, is jurisdictional.147 The 
                                                          
 134. Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1866 (2013).  
 135. Id.  
 136. See In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 646 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Kwai 
Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2013); Motta ex rel. A.M. v. United States, 717 F.3d 840, 846 
(11th Cir. 2013); Goldblatt v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., No. 11-4307-cv, WL 5458082 (2d Cir. Nov. 9, 2012); 
Bazzo v. United States, 494 Fed. Appx. 545, 546 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 137. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. 130, 143 (2008) (Stevens J., concurring). 
 138. Id. at 139 (majority opinion).  
 139. Id. at 143 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 140. See e.g., Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 414 (filing deadline for fee application under Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 459-60 (filing deadlines for objection to debtor’s discharge 
in bankruptcy).  
 141. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012). 
 142. In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 646 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at 190.  
 146. Id.  
 147. In re FEMA, 646 F.3d at 190. This former majority rule was often read very broadly. David D. Doran, 
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court refused to reach the merits of the case as doing so would have, in the court’s view, 
“extend[ed] the waiver beyond that which Congress intended.”148 
Until late 2013, the Ninth Circuit also refused to allow equitable tolling of claims 
under section 2401(b) of the FTCA.149 In a long line of cases, it preserved section 2401(b)’s 
incompatibility with equitable tolling principles under the rationale that strict compliance 
with its timing requirement is a precondition to the district court’s jurisdiction.150 This 
position was strange given the court’s previous holding that section 2401(a)’s requirements 
established a waivable procedural bar151 and its earlier case’s express adoption of tolling 
pursuant to 2401(b).152 Those occasional contradictory holdings evidently did not deter the 
circuit’s overall distaste for equitable tolling in the context section 2401(b)153 until it—
sitting en banc—overruled those decisions in Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe.154 
B. Trending Authority 
The Third Circuit observes a different interpretation, allowing equitable tolling of 
section 2401(b) for deserving plaintiffs.155 This circuit also grappled with contrary inter-
pretations in its precedent.156 However, the court explained its post-Irwin rationale by stat-
ing “[w]e believe that Congress, in adopting the statute of limitations in the FTCA, did not 
demonstrate that it intended to preclude equitable tolling . . . .”157 The panel recognized the 
turbulence of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, but it correctly recognized the fact that 
Irwin is still good law and that John R. Sand seemingly allowed the court to follow its own 
precedent on this issue.158 In addition to the Third Circuit, the First, Seventh, Eight, and 
Tenth Circuits all apply the equitable tolling doctrine to section 2401(b) based on the same 
rationale.159 
                                                          
Equitable Tolling of Statutory Benefit Time Limitations: A Congressional Intent Analysis, 64 WASH. L. REV. 681, 
684-85 & n.24 (1989) (“[S]tatutes of limitation that limit the time during which actions may be brought against 
the federal government are ‘jurisdictional,’ rather than ‘substantive’ or [‘]procedural,’ because their expiration 
deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case”).  
 148. Id. (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118 (1979)). At least one court had held that wide-
spread publicity regarding the government’s role in causing a harm is sufficient for the limitations period to begin 
to run. See Donahue v. United States, 634 F.3d 615 (1st Cir. 2011).  
 149. See Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (overruling the Ninth’s Circuit’s 
longstanding line of jurisprudence refusing to apply equitable tolling to section 2401(b)).  
 150. See Adams v. United States, 658 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2011); N. Am. Broad., LLC v. United States, 306 Fed. 
App’x 371 (9th Cir. 2008); Marley v. United States, 567 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2008); Augustine v. United States, 
704 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1983); Blain v. United States, 552 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1977); Mann v. United States, 399 
F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1968).  
 151. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 152. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting “[n]othing in the FTCA 
indicates that Congress intended for equitable tolling not to apply. Hence, equitable tolling is available for FTCA 
claims in the appropriate circumstances; and the circumstances of this case are highly appropriate for tolling.”).  
 153. See e.g., Adams, 658 F.3d 928.  
 154. Kwai, 732 F.3d 1030.  
 155. Santos ex rel. Beatos v. United States, 559 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2009).  
 156. See e.g., Bradley v. United States, 856 F.2d 575, 577-78 (3d Cir. 1988).  
 157. Santos, 559 F.3d at 195-96.  
 158. Id. at 197. See also Compton, supra note 16.  
 159. Donahue v. United States, 634 F.3d 615 (1st Cir. 2011); Arteaga v. United States, 711 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 
2013); Motley v. United States, 295 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2002); McKinney v. United States, 428 Fed. App’x 795 
(10th Cir. 2011). 
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C. The Remaining Frontier 
The Second, Sixth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have yet to define their stance on the 
question of whether equitable tolling applies to section 2401(b).160 The D.C. Circuit cor-
rectly noted the reason for the indecision by stating that “[w]e have never squarely ad-
dressed whether equitable tolling applies to the FTCA’s statute of limitations, and we need 
not do so here, for [the plaintiff] has failed to meet the due diligence requirement of equi-
table tolling.”161 Facing the same problem these four circuits continue to wait for the proper 
plaintiff to arrive before setting forth a particular view of section 2401(b).162 Therefore, 
potential plaintiffs in these jurisdictions face uncertainty due to the lack of a definitive 
ruling by either their particular circuit or the Supreme Court.163 
V. HISTORICAL TREATMENT: KUBRICK AND MCNEIL 
This section analyzes the Supreme Court’s historical treatment of two pertinent pro-
visions of the FTCA.164 Recent cases, particularly John R. Sand, placed overwhelming 
weight on the Court’s earlier interpretations of the provision at issue.165 However, this sec-
tion argues that section 2401(b) is antithetical to section 2501 of the Tucker Act to the 
extent that it has not received the same extensive treatment.166 This dearth of historical 
treatment is arguably insufficient to support the presumption that a Supreme Court encoun-
ter with section 2401(b) would lead to an outcome like the aberration that was John R. 
Sand.167 To the contrary, the Court’s current disposition towards waivers of sovereign im-
munity in general and statutes of limitations in particular strongly suggests that section 
2401(b) is not jurisdictional.168 
In 1979 the Supreme Court decided United States v. Kubrick, where it faced the issue 
regarding when a claim accrues under the FTCA.169 In Kubrick, the plaintiff developed 
acute hearing loss after receiving treatment for an infected femur at a Veteran’s Admin-
istration (“VA”) hospital in 1968.170 Independent physicians subsequently confirmed his 
bilateral nerve deafness.171 In 1969, one of those independent physicians, upon reviewing 
                                                          
 160. M.J. ex rel. Jarvis v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 13-283(GK), 2013 WL 4478681 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 
2013); Phillips v. Generations Family Health Ctr., 723 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013); Bazzo v. United States, 494 Fed. 
App’x 545 (6th Cir. 2012); Motta ex rel. A.M. v. United States, 717 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 2013).  
 161. Norman v. United States, 467 F.3d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
 162. Phillips, 723 F.3d at 149.  
 163. Bazzo, 494 Fed. Appx. at 546 n.2 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting the various approaches taken by district and 
appellate courts on the issue). 
 164. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 169 (2010).   
 165. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008).   
 166. Id. at 144-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The only assertion of inconsistency in this regard is to precedential 
authority. As Justice Ginsburg noted, section 2501 and section 2401 offer similar linguistics despite their dissim-
ilar histories. Id.  
 167. See generally id.  
 168. Id. at 144-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 169. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 113 (1979). “A tort claim . . . shall be forever barred unless it is 
presented . . . within two years after such claim accrues . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012). For a thorough analysis 
of the FTCA’s accrual rule in the context of medical malpractice claims, see Cory Zajdel, Discovery Rule in 
Medical malpractice Under the Federal Tort Claims Act: The Supreme Court’s Decision in United States v. 
Kubrick Was Not Meant to be Secondary Authority, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 443 (2004); David L. 
Abney, For Whom the Statute Tolls: Medical Malpractice Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 61 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 696 (1986).   
 170. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 113-14.  
 171. Id. at 114.  
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the records from the VA hospital, opined that Mr. Kubrick’s deafness resulted from that 
hospital’s treatment.172 However, Mr. Kubrick did not actually file his claim until 1972, 
more than two-years after he initially received notification of the possible connection be-
tween his treatment at the VA hospital and his hearing loss.173 The district court allowed 
the suit to proceed and the appellate court affirmed, both agreeing that the statute of limi-
tations did not begin to run in 1969 because the plaintiff did not reasonably know that his 
treatment at the VA hospital was the cause of his injury.174 
The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the district and appellate courts and 
held that a claim accrues under section 2401(b) when the plaintiff knows the cause and the 
existence of his injury, not when he knows that the cause was the negligence of a govern-
ment employee.175 En route to this holding the Court made the observation that the obvious 
purpose of section 2401(b) is the “prompt presentation of claims.”176 It described section 
2401(b) as a statute of limitations that served as a condition upon the FTCA’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity.177 Accordingly, the Court assumed that it did not have the authority 
to either expand or narrow the scope of the waiver beyond what Congress intended.178 
However, the Court took note of the fact that the legislative history of the FTCA was 
silent on the issue of claim accrual.179 Indeed, the Court noted that the 1949 House Report, 
“[did] not explain how to determine the date of accrual.”180 Due to this lack of congres-
sional guidance, the Court applied the common law accrual rule.181 In so doing, the Court 
implicitly adopted the notion that common law principles are applicable to section 2401(b) 
so as to extend the limitation beyond two-years from the actual date of the injury.182 Cer-
tainly, this was readily apparent when the Court stated that it “should regard the plea of 
limitations as a ‘meritorious defense, in itself serving the public interest.’”183 Only when 
viewing section 2401(b) as an ordinary statute of limitations, and not a jurisdictional ab-
solute, would the defendant have to plead it as a defense.184 
In 1993 the Court, per Justice Stevens, addressed the issue of whether a claimant 
may file suit pursuant to the FTCA before exhausting all administrative remedies in McNeil 
v. United States.185 Section 2675(a) of the FTCA provides “[a]n action shall not be insti-
tuted upon a claim against the United States for money damages or injury . . . unless the 
claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his 
                                                          
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 115.  
 174. Id. at 116.  
 175. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 123.  
 176. Id. at 117.  
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. at 117-18.  
 179. Id. at 119 n.6.  
 180. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 119 n.9.  
 181. Id. at 123.  
 182. Id.   
 183. Id. at 117 (quoting Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938)).  
 184. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. 130, 133 (2008) (noting “the law typically treats a limitations 
defense as an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise at the pleadings stage that is subject to rules of 
forfeiture and waiver.”). 
 185. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 107 (1993). 
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claim shall have been finally denied . . . .”186 The Court found that this language unambig-
uously required the complete exhaustion of administrative remedies before a claimant 
could properly file suit.187 In so holding, the Court found that the language of the statute 
indicated a congressional intent to avoid placing an extra burden on the judicial system and 
the Department of Justice via prematurely filed claims.188 Thus, it concluded that a strictly 
literal reading promoted the “orderly administration of this body of litigation . . . .”189 
On the surface, these two cases present somewhat competing agendas, however, they 
are reconcilable.190 On the one hand, they both provide a clear signal that the Court is 
unwilling to expand the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity beyond what Congress 
intended, aided in no small part by the now disfavored strict construction canon.191 Addi-
tionally, as Kubrick accurately noted in regards to claim accrual, there are issues on which 
Congress failed to provide guidance.192 In order to fill that gap, Kubrick expanded the 
waiver by delaying the start of the two-year limitations period until the claim accrued.193 
Contrary to the flexibility exercised by the Court in Kubrick, McNeil refused to stretch the 
scope of the waiver to include premature claims.194 
The reconciling principle in these two cases is the notion that section 2675(a) and 
section 2401(b) serve different purposes.195 From a practical perspective, section 2401(b) 
is not implicated by section 2675(a) and therefore is not subject to the stringent reading 
employed in McNeil.196 Instead, section 2675(a) is concerned with allowing the proper 
federal administrative agency sufficient time to investigate, and if necessary, to settle the 
claim.197 For this reason, the McNeil Court felt the need to strictly construe the administra-
tive exhaustion requirement to allow federal agencies the opportunity to investigate and 
evaluate claims.198 Section 2401(b) simply does not share this concern.199 Instead, its con-
cern is wholly to provide notice to the proper administrative agency in sufficient time to 
avoid stale evidence and then encourage filing suit in federal district court while the claim 
is still fresh with that agency.200 Because these concerns differ significantly, McNeil is less 
applicable to section 2401(b) than Kubrick.201 In other words, McNeil’s orderly administra-
tion focus should not outweigh Kubrick’s concern regarding the prompt presentation of 
claims especially in light of Kubrick’s acquiescence to applying common law principles to 
fill Congress’s omissions from section 2401(b).202 With this historical treatment in mind, 
                                                          
 186. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2012).  
 187. McNeil, 508 U.S. at 111.  
 188. Id. at 112.  
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. at 113; United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979).  
 191. McNeil, 508 U.S. 106; Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 113-14.  
 192. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 119 n.6.  
 193. Id. at 123.  
 194. McNeil, 508 U.S. at 111.  
 195. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a) (2012). 
 196. McNeil, 508 U.S. at 111.  
 197. Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1047 (9th Cir 2013) (en banc). See also Axelrad, supra note 
41.  
 198. McNeil, 508 U.S. at 111.  
 199. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012).  
 200. Kwai, 732 F.3d at 1047.  
 201. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979).  
 202. Kwai, 732 F.3d at 1047.   
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we now turn to an examination of section 2401(b) itself and address its hermeneutical con-
tours.203 
VI.  PROPERLY CONSTRUED, SECTION 2401(B) IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL 
This section argues that section 2401(b) is not jurisdictional by breaking it down into 
its component parts and employing the diagnostic approach set forth by the Supreme Court 
and occasionally—though far too infrequently—followed by lower courts when construing 
statutory provisions of this kind.204 Analytically, the jurisdictional nature of a statutory 
provision is inherently an examination of the legal character of the requirement itself, and 
therefore is quintessentially an exercise in hermeneutics.205 Thus, the Supreme Court ap-
proach is to examine the statute’s language, placement, purpose, and its historical treat-
ment.206 
Unfortunately, circuit courts rarely engage in this exhausting analytical endeavor and 
instead merely perform what the Supreme Court terms “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” 
which provide no real evaluation or insight into the true nature of the provision at hand.207 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, however, broke that trend 
and provided the most thorough dissection of section 2401(b) by any court to date.208 The 
following discussion attempts to expand and strengthen the Ninth Circuit’s majority ap-
proach, and in the process provide a comprehensive evaluation of section 2401(b) from 
both a linguistic and teleological standpoint.209 
A. Language 
The Supreme Court’s approach to statutory construction always begins with an eval-
uation of the statute’s text, regardless of any textualist210 or intentionalist211 predispositions 
                                                          
 203. See e.g., LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992). 
 204. See e.g., Klatch v. Rathman, No. 1:13-CV-01452, 2014 WL 537021 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 10, 2014).  
 205. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 (2010).  
 206. Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 611 (2010). Other courts evaluate additional considerations such as 
whether any exceptions generally applicable to the statute shed light on the particular provision. Due to the nec-
essary extent of that discussion, it is inevitably beyond the scope of this paper. See generally id.   
 207. Arbough v. Y & H Co., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 
U.S. 83, 91 (1998)); Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation, 
30 J. LEGIS. 1, 5 (2003) (“The concepts and tools of statutory interpretation are not the mechanical product of 
some kind of positivistic, intellectual assembly line. Statutory interpretation is a process of the mind, not the 
application of a yardstick.”). See also Avila-Santoyo v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 713 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2013).  
 208. Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).  
 209. Id.  
 210. Under the textualist approach, the wording of a statute must be given its plain meaning without recourse 
to legislative history, particularly when the statute itself is unambiguous and specifically targets the issue at hand. 
Ellen P. Aprill & Nancy Staudt, Theories of Statutory Interpretation (And Their Limits), 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1899, 1900 (2005). The rationale for this approach is that Congress meant to say what it said in the statute, and 
that only the specific words in the statute were debated, voted on, and codified, not the legislative history. James 
M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation”, 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 891 (1930) (“The gravest sins are 
perpetrated in the name of the intent of the legislature.”).  
 211. The intentionalist label is admittedly outdated and overly broad. The faithful agency approach is perhaps 
the most formidable adversary to textualism. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful 
Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109 (2010).  
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among the Justices.212 The purpose in this initial step of the analytical schema is to deter-
mine whether the text’s meaning, without more, is sufficiently clear.213 This initial inquiry 
asks whether the statute’s words or phrases are ambiguous214 and, if not, whether the plain 
meaning215 of the statute produces an absurd result.216 The analysis that follows evaluates 
the text of section 2401(b), considering the principle that a court should not move beyond 
the text when the text is neither ambiguous nor produces an inherently absurd result.217 
The operative clause of section 2401(b) states that, “[a] tort claim against the United 
States shall be forever barred unless . . . .”218 As a preliminary matter, this language—and 
section 2401 generally—makes no mention of a court’s jurisdiction nor does it tend to 
speak in jurisdictional parlance.219 Even so, when properly understood, the phrase “forever 
barred” itself is not wholly incompatible with the doctrine of equitable tolling.220 Equitable 
tolling reveals that instead of turning old claims new it “prevents them from becoming 
stale in the first place.”221 The only indication from this language, then, is that “forever 
                                                          
 212. United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1395, 1399, 188 L.Ed.2d 413 (2014) (“The beginning 
point is the relevant statutory text.”); Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013) (quoting BP Am. Prod. Co. 
v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006)) (“As in any statutory construction case, ‘[w]e start, of course, with the statutory 
text,’ and proceed from the understanding that ‘[u]nless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally inter-
preted in accordance with their ordinary meaning.’”); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dept. of Revenue, 131 S Ct. 
1101, 1107 (2011) (“We begin, as in any case of statutory interpretation, with the language of the statute.”).  
 213. “Our ‘inquiry ceases [in a statutory construction case] if the statutory language is unambiguous and the 
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” Cloer, 133 S. Ct. at 1895 (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 
534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)). See also Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (quoting Hartford Under-
writers Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) (“[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the 
sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it 
according to its terms.”); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We are to read 
the words of that text as any ordinary Member of Congress would have read them, and apply the meaning so 
determined.”).  
 214. In distinguishing vagueness from ambiguity it should be noted that “[a] vague word has one meaning (and 
its application is unclear in some cases); [and] an ambiguous word has more than one meaning (and it may be 
unclear, in some cases, which is in use).” TIMOTHY O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 54 (2000). See also, KENT 
GREENWALT, LEGAL INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES AND PRIVATE TEXTS 38-45 
(2010). 
 215. Judge Raymond Randolph noted that even the notion of plain meaning has inherent complexities, partic-
ularly due to the fact that words must be interpreted both in the context of the statute itself and in the context of 
the time at which the statute was enacted. A Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in 
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 73-74 (1994).  
 216. The absurdity doctrine can be stated simply as the Court’s unwillingness to apply an unambiguous text if 
doing so will lead to an obviously absurd result. JOSEPH L. GERKEN, WHAT GOOD IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: 
JUSTICE SCALIA IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 201 (2007). One of the Court’s earliest explanations of 
the doctrine was in Sturgess v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 202-03 (1819) (“[I]f . . . the plain meaning of a 
provision . . . is to be disregarded, because we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they 
say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be so mon-
strous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, united in rejecting the application.”). See also John F. Man-
ning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003).  
 217. See Cloer, 133 S. Ct. at 1896; see also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 649, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (noting “the acid test of whether a word can reasonably bear a particular meaning is whether you 
could use the word in that sense at a cocktail party without having people look at you funny.”).  
 218. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012).  
 219. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 (2011).  
 220. Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1999).  
 221. Id. See also Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1231-32 (2014) (“equitable tolling pauses the 
running of, or ‘tolls,’ a statute of limitations when a litigant had pursued his rights diligently but some extraordi-
nary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action.”). The equitable tolling doctrine, in some rare 
cases, may stop, then start again, if the extraordinary circumstances reappear. United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1, 
5 (1991).  
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barred” means neither more nor less than an ordinary statute of limitations, i.e., that Con-
gress struck a balance between litigating a claim on the merits and avoiding claims bur-
dened by faded memories.222 The Ninth Circuit explained it best, noting that section 
2401(b) “merely states what is ordinarily true of filing deadlines: once the limitations pe-
riod ends, whether extended by the application of tolling principles or not, a plaintiff is 
‘forever barred’ from presenting his claim to the relevant adjudicatory body.”223 Thus, eq-
uity keeps a claim from becoming stale while still allowing the government to defend a 
case before evidence becomes lost or destroyed.224 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the issue adds weight to the notion 
that the words “forever barred” are insufficient to support a reading of the statute as juris-
dictional.225 The Court repeatedly states that it overtly “reject[s] the notion that ‘all man-
datory prescriptions, however emphatic, are . . . properly typed jurisdictional.’”226 The 
Court never requires Congress to use certain words to indicate whether a provision is ju-
risdictional, instead holding that the context of a word may provide valuable insight.227 
However, the context of section 2401(b) does not indicate that the words “forever barred” 
have any special significance apart from that of normal statutes of limitations.228 
The Ninth Circuit took note of the background in which Congress enacted section 
2401(b), emphasizing that the phrase “forever barred” is commonplace statutory language, 
especially in the mid-twentieth century when the FTCA was initially enacted.229 In fact, 
Congress enacted numerous statutes around the time of the FTCA that included those same 
words.230 Due to the frequency with which Congress employed the “forever barred” lan-
guage, section 2401(b), when enacted, was nothing more than an ordinary statute of limi-
tations to which Congress understood tolling principles applied.231 Moreover, recent Su-
preme Court jurisprudence fortifies the nonjurisdictional character of the phrase via a 
reliance on the background rule supplied in Irwin.232 Indeed, it is a well-established prin-
ciple today, if not in the mid-twentieth century, that the Congress does not pass statutes in 
a vacuum, but instead understands the general presumptions, such as equitable tolling, that 
courts use to interpret statutes as a matter of course.233 
                                                          
 222. Sanchez v. United States, 740 F.3d 47, 57 (1st Cir. 2014).  
 223. Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 
U.S. 111, 117 (1079)) (emphasis added).   
 224. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117.  
 225. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011).  
 226. Id. at 1205 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of 
Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67, 81 (2009)); see also Arbough v. Y & H Co., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006).   
 227. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1203.  
 228. Kwai, 732 F.3d at 1039.  
 229. Id. (noting “§ 2401(b)’s ‘forever barred’ language appears to be more a vestige of mid-twentieth century 
congressional drafting conventions than a ‘clear statement’ of Congress’s intent to include a jurisdictional filing 
deadline in the FTCA.”).  
 230. See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1223 (1956) (“Any action brought pursuant to this chapter shall be forever barred 
unless commenced within three years after the cause of action shall have accrued.”); 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1947) 
(“every such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued 
. . .”); see also Kwai, 732 F.3d at 1039 (discussing other similar statutes).  
 231. Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 917 (5th Cir. 1999).  
 232. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 143 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 233. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1232 (2014) (“As applied to federal statutes of limitations, 
the inquiry begins with the understanding that Congress ‘legislate[s] against a background of common-law adju-
dicatory principles. Equitable tolling, a long-established feature of American jurisprudence derived from ‘the old 
chancery rule,’ is just such a principle.”) (internal citations omitted). See also John F. Manning, Textualism and 
20
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Neither John R. Sand, nor any case to date, has overruled Irwin or replaced the gen-
eral notion that such background principles apply no less to government statutes of limita-
tions than to private individuals.234 Tellingly, Justice Ginsburg dissent in John R. Sand 
noted that section 2501 of the Tucker Act and section 2401(b) of the FTCA contain nearly 
identical language.235 She reasoned, and the majority seemed to agree, that but for the 
Court’s existing jurisdictional construction of the Tucker Act’s limitation provision, it 
would have held section 2501—and by implication section 2401(b), as well—to be nonju-
risdictional.236 Therefore, because the phrase “forever barred” means no more than what is 
ordinarily true of statutes of limitations, it provides no indication that section 2401(b) is a 
jurisdictional bar.237 
Beyond the phrase “forever barred,” the word “shall” warrants consideration.238 As 
a preliminary matter, “shall” does not have a settled meaning but, rather, courts have in-
terpreted it at least five different ways.239 This multiplicity of meanings presents a difficult 
problem for courts when applying the mandatory/permissive cannon of statutory interpre-
tation, i.e., the notion that mandatory words impose duties and permissive words grant 
discretion.240 Historically, the Supreme Court has been less than consistent with its use of 
the term.241 Despite the confusion and misconception, it is commonly agreed that courts 
should read “shall” as mandatory whenever a statute is unambiguous or when it is reason-
able to do so.242 As such, the Court yearns for coherent interpretations to both avoid erro-
neous results and to prevent unintentional problems never anticipated by the drafting leg-
islature.243 
In order to determine whether “shall” is mandatory or discretionary as used in section 
2401(b), courts must consider it’s proper context.244 Of particular importance is the fact 
                                                          
the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 114 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute]; Finley 
v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (“What is of paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate 
against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts.”). 
 234. Arteaga v. United States, 711 F.3d 828, 833 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The opinion in John R. Sand & Gravel 
actually reaffirms the presumption that equitable tolling applies to statutes of limitations in suits against the gov-
ernment, while emphasizing that the presumption is rebuttable.”). 
 235. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 145-46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (“Every 
claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition 
thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues”).  
 236. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 145-46 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).   
 237. Arteaga, 711 F.3d at 833.  
 238. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012).  
 239. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1499 (9th ed. 2009). 
 240. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 105, at 112.  
 241. Id. at 114. W. Wis. Ry. v. Foley, 94 U.S. 100, 103 (1876) (‘“Shall ought undoubtedly to be construed as 
meaning ‘must,’ for the purpose of sustaining or enforcing an existing right; but need not be for creating a new 
one.”); R.R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U.S. 168, 170 (1877) (noting “the word ‘shall’ when used in statutes, is to be 
construed as ‘may,’ unless a contrary intention is manifest.”); Moore v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630, 635 (1941) 
(“This difference in language, substituting ‘may’ for ‘shall,’ was not, we think, an indication of a change in policy, 
but was instead a clarification of the law’s original purpose.”); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 146-47 
(1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In a linguistic tour side force the Court converts the mandatory language that 
the interception ‘shall be conducted’ to be a precatory suggestion.”); United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 
711, 718 (1990) (“Congress’ mere use of the word ‘shall’ was not enough to remove the Secretary’s power to 
act.”); Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 432 n.9 (1995) (“Though ‘shall’ generally means ‘must,’ 
legal writers sometimes use, or misuse, ‘shall’ to mean ‘should,’ ‘will,’ or even ‘may.’”).  
 242. Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153 (2001) (“The word ‘shall’ is ordinarily ‘the language of com-
mand.’”) (quoting Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947)).  
 243. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES 150 (2010). 
 244. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012). Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2530 (2013) (“Text 
may not be divorced from context.”).  
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that Congress drafted the phrase “shall be forever barred” in the passive tense thereby 
lending credence to the notion that its command is less than mandatory.245 The passive 
syntax of the phrase leads to two possible conclusions.246 It is reasonably directed at either 
the plaintiff or the court, and, if the former, then it would not mandate a court to do any-
thing.247 Due to this ambiguity, the phrase’s construction does not clearly state that Con-
gress intended it to have mandatory consequences.248 In the absence of sufficient clarity, 
the Supreme Court cautions against jumping to a jurisdictional conclusion, instead opting 
to treat the statute as nonjurisdictional by default.249 This circumspect approach advocated 
by the Court guards against the tendency to seize upon the word “shall” as an indicator of 
jurisdiction.250 
Previous decisions illustrate this cautious approach in the context of a party attempt-
ing to use the word “shall” to prevent a court from taking action to which a missed statutory 
deadline refers.251 In Dolan v. United States the Court determined that language in the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act252 that included the word “shall” did not, without more, 
render the statutory deadline jurisdictional.253 Similarly, section 2401(b)’s use of the word 
“shall” does not require the court to dismiss a case for the plaintiff’s failure to strictly 
comply with its requirements.254 The Court frequently maintains the principle that em-
phatic and mandatory language is not enough to render a statute jurisdictional.255 Based 
upon that abundance of caution, “shall” by itself is insufficient to reveal any indication that 
Congressional sought to exclude filing extensions via equitable principles.256 These syn-
tactic and precedential considerations provide little indication that Congress intended dras-
tic consequences such as denying the application of Irwin’s presumption.257 
Even though contrary appellate opinions seem to convey the idea that section 
2401(b) is subject to ambiguous interpretations, this section argues otherwise.258 The fact 
that courts and commentators reach contrary conclusions as to the meaning of a statute 
does not, per se, mean that the statute is ambiguous.259 It is often the case that parties or 
                                                          
 245. Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Flora v. United States, 362 
U.S. 145, 150 (1960) (“This Court naturally does not review congressional enactments as a panel of grammarians; 
but neither do we regard ordinary principles of English prose as irrelevant to a construction of those enact-
ments.”).  
 246. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012).  
 247. Kwai, 732 F.3d at 1040.  
 248. Id. at 1040-41. A consequentialist approach to the language of section 2401(b) necessarily runs astray of 
the plain text of the provision, possibly leading to inherently unpredictable reader-oriented tendencies. SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 105, at 16-17. 
 249. Arbough v. Y & H Co., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006).  
 250. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 651 (2012).  
 251. United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 718-19 (1990) (use of the word “shall” in the context 
of bail hearing makes duty mandatory but does not mean that the sanction for breach is loss of all powers to act.); 
Brock v. Pierce Cnty., 476 U.S. 253, 262 (1986) (same in the context of misuse of federal funds); Barnhart v. 
Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 158-63 (2003) (same in the context of benefits assignments).  
 252. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 201, 110 Stat. 1214, 1227 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A 
(2012)).  
 253. Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2539 (2010).  
 254. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012).   
 255. Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 651; Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1205 (2011); 
Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2539.  
 256. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013). 
 257. Gonzales, 132 S. Ct. at 648. 
 258. See e.g., In re FEMA Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 646 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2011).  
 259. GERKEN, supra note 216, at 194.   
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commentators will suggest that competing interpretations prove that a statute is ambiguous 
so as to allow the court to examine non-textual sources, such as legislative history.260 But, 
as Justice Thomas once declared, “[a] mere disagreement among litigants over the meaning 
of a statute does not prove ambiguity; it usually means that one of the litigants is simply 
wrong.”261 The Court’s recent jurisprudence arguably compels the conclusion that previous 
antithetical readings of section 2401(b) were just that—wrong, and that there is, and only 
ever was, one way to read section 2401(b).262 The following subsections proceed—despite 
the aforementioned claim that section 2401(b)’s language itself enough to support its non-
jurisdictional character—to bolster this conclusion by way of the provision’s placement 
and purpose.263 
B. Placement 
As a general matter, the Supreme Court has held that a statute of limitation is not 
transformed into a jurisdictional bar simply by means of its location within the particular 
statute.264 This is a time-honored approach by the Court.265 In Sebelius v. Auburn Regional 
Medical Center, the Court stated that “[a] requirement we would otherwise classify as 
nonjurisdictional does not become jurisdictional simply because it is placed in a section of 
a statute that contains jurisdictional provisions.”266 However, the location of a statute in a 
jurisdictional section, or the fact that it cross-references a jurisdictional provision, may 
indicate that Congress intended the section to carry jurisdictional consequences.267 
Looking to the FTCA itself, section 1346(b)(1), the statute’s jurisdiction-granting 
provision, states that “[s]ubject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district 
courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction.”268 However, section 2401(b) is not in chapter 
171, but instead is located in chapter 161, titled “United States as Party Generally.”269 
Similarly, there is no express reference anywhere in section 1346 to any particular provi-
sion in section 2401.270 Thus, a simple reading of those two sections seems to demonstrate 
                                                          
 260. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 461 (1999). See also 
Wis. R.R. Comm’n. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 589 (1922) (stating that legislative 
history is “admissible to solve doubt and not to create it.”); Michael C. Dorf, Foreward: The Limits of Socratic 
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1998).  
 261. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. at 461. Concluding that a statute is ambiguous brings its own prob-
lems, i.e., how to interpret and what weight to assign evidence of legislative intent. Mullins, supra note 207, at 
10.  
 262. Arteaga v. United States, 711 F.3d 828, 833 (7th Cir. 2013).  
 263. See Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1042-47 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).  
 264. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 651 (2012).  
 265. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947).  
[The] heading is but a short-hand reference to the general subject matter involved. . . . 
[H]eadings and titles are not meant to take the place of the detailed provisions of the text. 
Nor are they necessarily designed to be a reference guide or a synopsis. . . For interpretive 
purposes, they are of use only when they shed light on some ambiguous word or phrase. 
They are but tools available for the resolution of a doubt. But they cannot undo or limit 
that which the text makes plain. 
 Id.; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 105, at 221.  
 266. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 825 (2013). 
 267. Arbough v. Y & H Co., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006).   
 268. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (1996).  
 269. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012).  
 270. Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).  
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that Congress harbored no intention that a court should read the two sections together.271 
As noted in Part II, the current location of section 2401(b) in chapter 161, separate 
from section 1346’s jurisdictional provision, occurred in the 1948 recodification of the 
FTCA.272 The obvious potential concern is whether the failure of section 1346 to cross-
reference section 2401(b) is a mere scrivener’s error deserving of judicial correction.273 
Since construing section 2401(b) as nonjurisdictional is not an absurd result, a court is 
necessarily faced with the evidentiary problem of determining whether a scrivener’s error 
occurred and, if it determines that one occurred, how to rectify it.274 Thus, a court must turn 
to legislative history such as committee, Senate, or House reports to resolve this error is-
sue.275 However, recourse to such evidence blurs the line between statutory and legislative 
history.276 A court must give a recodification or reorganization its effect as implemented 
absent absurd results or clear scrivener’s error such as a missing word or punctuation.277 
Although contradictory interpretations remain, construing section 2401(b) as nonjurisdic-
tional does not produce absurd results and sections 2401(b) and 1346(b)(1) do not produce 
readily apparent errors; indeed, the two operate harmoniously.278 Therefore, an examina-
tion of epistemically fallible reports and uncodified legislative records is arguably unnec-
essary altogether.279 
Assuming, arguendo, that section 1346’s failure to cross-reference chapter 161 was 
a mere congressional oversight or drafting error, nearly seventy years of inaction consti-
tutes sufficient evidence that section 2401(b) is not jurisdictional vis-à-vis section 
1346(b)(1).280 After the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Irwin, Congress made 
no effort to clarify section 2401(b) so as to exclude the possibility of equitable tolling, 
despite its most recent modification of the FTCA in 2011.281 In Holland v. Florida, for 
example, the Court noted that Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996282 after its decision in Irwin.283 From that fact, the Court 
drew a presumption that Congress must have known that Irwin’s presumption would apply 
to the AEDPA’s limitations provision just like any other federal statute of limitations.284 
In like manner, Congress could have modified section 2401(b) to specifically exclude the 
application of Irwin’s presumption by correcting section 1346’s failure to cross-reference 
                                                          
 271. Id.  
 272. See Pub. L. No. 80-773 (“1948 Act”), § 1, 62 Stat. 869 (1948).  
 273. See e.g., John David Ohlendorf, Textualism And The Problem of Scrivener’s Error, 64 ME. L. REV. 119 
(2011); Michael S. Fried, A Theory of Scrivener’s Error, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 589 (2000).  
 274. Ohlendorf, supra note 273, at 161.  
 275. Id. at 158.  
 276. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 105, at 256.  
 277. Id. at 256-60.  
 278. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 1346(b)(1) (2012).  
 279. Ohlendorf, supra note 273, at 161; see also John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. 
REV. 1287, 1307 (2010) (“[The Court] has apparently reached an equilibrium that greatly tempers judicial reli-
ance on legislative history as a source of evidence while enhancing judicial attention to the text.”).  
 280. Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1042 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).  
 281. See Pub. L. No. 111-350 § 5(g)(8), 124 Stat. 3848 (2011).  
 282. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 106(b)(3)(E), 110 Stat. 1214, 1221 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) 
(1994)).   
 283. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 646 (2010). 
 284. Id.  
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chapter 161.285 However, Congress’s 2011 modifications to the FTCA did not do so; lead-
ing to the conclusion that Congress was presumably not bothered by the potential applica-
tion of Irwin’s presumption to section 2401(b).286 
Opponents of this position argue that the 1948 recodification of the FTCA, which 
removed section 2401(b) from section 1346, did not change what was previously a juris-
dictional provision into a nonjurisdictional provision.287 Support for this position is prem-
ised on the 1948 Reviser’s Notes which concluded that the recodification did not intend to 
change the substance of section 2401(b).288 The Supreme Court addressed a similar argu-
ment in United States v. Wells.289  In Wells, a unanimous court stated: 
 
Respondents also rely on the 1948 Reviser’s Note to § 1014, which dis-
cussed the consolidation of the 13 provisions into one, and explained 
that, apart from two changes not relevant here, the consolidation was 
without change of substance. . . .  Respondents say that the reviser’s fail-
ure to mention the omission of materiality from the text of § 1014 means 
that Congress must have completely overlooked the issue. . . . But surely 
this indication that the staff experts who prepared the legislation, either 
overlooked or chose to say nothing about changing the language of three 
of the former statutes does nothing to muddy the ostensibly unambigu-
ous provision of the statute as enacted by Congress. . . . In any event, the 
revisers’ assumption that the consolidation made no substantive change 
was simply wrong. . . . Those who write revisers’ notes have proven 
fallible before.290 
 
As previously mentioned, the text of the statute is preeminent, especially when its applica-
tion does not lead to absurd results.291 Based upon this previous treatment by the Court, it 
is unlikely that a comment in the more than sixty-year-old Revisers’ Notes would alter the 
conclusion that a plain reading of the statute reveals today.292 
Finally, accepting that equitable tolling is compatible with section 2401(b) neces-
sarily precludes the application of the oft quoted “inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” 
canon.293 As mentioned at the outset, in 1988 Congress amended the FTCA to include a 
tolling provision for the erroneous omission of the government as the proper defendant.294 
However, section 2401(b) is an insufficiently exhaustive limitation provision295 rendering 
                                                          
 285. Kwai, 732 F.3d at 1042.  
 286. Pub. L. No. 111-350 § 5(g)(8), 124 Stat. 3848 (2011).  
 287. Kwai, 732 F.3d at 1058 (Tashima, Circuit Justice, dissenting).  
 288. Id.  
 289. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997).  
 290. Id. at 496-97 (internal quotations omitted).  
 291. Justice Scalia once expressed the idea by stating that “Congress can enact foolish statutes as well as wise 
ones, and it is not for the courts to decide which is which and rewrite the former.” ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER 
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 20 (1997).  
 292. Wells, 519 U.S. at 96-97.  
 293. The phrase roughly translates to “the express mention of one thing excludes anything else not mentioned.” 
Mullins, supra note 207, at 23.  
 294. Pub. L. No. 100-694, §§ 5, 6, 102 Stat. 4564 (1988).  
 295. See e.g., United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38 (1998); United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997).  
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the canon entirely inapposite.296 Further, the FTCA is inherently—if not expressly—com-
mitted to the common-law of torts upon which it is built, such that courts may use common-
law principles to fill the gaps of omitted cases.297 The ensuing section explicates the ra-
tionale for applying equitable tolling as completely consistent with the FTCA’s overall 
purpose despite its omission, rather than precluding it because of its exclusion.298 
C. Purpose 
It is axiomatic that Congress need not—and simply cannot—predict each and every 
scenario to which a statute applies.299 For this reason, federal judges inherently posses the 
power to interpret a statute in those unanticipated situations, presumably furthering the 
overall purpose of the statute as a whole.300 According to Professor Manning, 
 
The most important alternative justification for atextual and purposive 
interpretation relates to an ancient common law doctrine: the equity of 
the statute . . . when applied, that doctrine authorized courts to extend a 
clear statute to reach omitted cases that fell within its ration or pur-
pose . . . when the text would inflict harsh results that did not serve the 
statutory purpose.301 
 
Even strict textualists agree that “‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person 
would gather from the text of the [statute], placed alongside the remainder of the corpus 
juris” can provide a means of addressing those cases for which the text alone is insuffi-
cient.302 
As the express purpose of the FTCA is to treat the government exactly like “private 
individuals under like circumstances” and to provide redress for common-law torts, tradi-
tional tort principles such as equitable tolling are inherently compatible to the FTCA.303 
Tort law arose primarily as a product of common law rather than statutes.304 However, 
historically, tort-law statutes of limitations were always subject to principles of equitable 
tolling.305 Furthermore, the Supreme Court presumes—as do lower courts—that Congress 
                                                          
 296. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 105, at 107-11.  
 297. Id. at 96, 99.  
 298. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012).  
 299. Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 233, at 25.  
 300. Id. at 22-23. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (“When ‘interpreting a statute, the court will 
not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the 
whole statute . . . and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by the its various provisions, and give to it 
such a construction as will carry into execution the will of the legislature . . . .”) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19 
How. 183, 194 (1857)).  
 301. Id. at 22. Professor Manning argues that the equity of the statute theory did not survive into modern 
American jurisprudence. Id. at 126. However, the Supreme Court typically presumes that Congress drafts with 
knowledge of the time-honored theory. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1941 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).   
 302. SCALIA, supra note 291, at 17; see also John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 79 (2006).  
 303. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).  
 304. See PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 19 (5th ed. 1984) (“Tort law is 
overwhelmingly common law, developed in case by case decision making by courts.”).  
 305. See Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744,749 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying equitable tolling to a suit in 
admiralty because “actions in admiralty are based in principles of tort.”); Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 560 
(2000) (noting the settled “understanding that federal statutes of limitations are generally subject to equitable 
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passes tort statutes “against the backdrop of common law rules of tort law.”306 By impli-
cation, Congress simply cannot include a statute of limitations in a tort statute without 
knowledge that courts automatically presume equitable tolling applies.307 Section 2401(b), 
a fortiori, must be interpreted against this common law background.308 Indeed, in Kubrick, 
the Court applied the traditional tort concept of claim accrual in determining when section 
2401(b)’s period began to run.309 The simple recognition that the statute of limitation does 
not begin to run until discovered—a common-law tort rule—supports the proposition that 
section 2401(b)’s limitations period is not absolute and is instead subject to equitable en-
largement as is any normal tort claim.310 
Moreover, disallowance of equitable tolling runs entirely counter to the purpose of 
the FTCA, as it would allow a government employee to commit a tortious act and subse-
quently prevent the claimant from filing his or her claim, even if diligently pursued.311 
Thus, the maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria finds itself fully 
applicable to government defendants under the FTCA no less than to private individuals.312 
This rationale is quite obvious because the language of the FTCA explicitly indicates that 
its purpose is to treat the government like a private individual.313 As previously mentioned, 
Congress’s primary objective was to compensate victims of ordinary common-law torts 
negligently committed by government employees within the scope of their employment 
who previously had to introduce private bills in Congress.314 That purpose is ill served by 
an overly restrictive reading of section 2401(b).315 
Holland v. Florida is illustrative of this point as well.316 The AEDPA provided a one-
year statute of limitations for filing a writ of habeas corpus and further stated that while a 
state post-conviction appeal is pending, the one–year statute of limitation did not run 
against the defendant.317 The Court read this to be an “ordinary, run-of-the-mill statute of 
limitations.”318 Based on that reading of the statute the Court had no difficulty applying 
equitable tolling to the provision.319 One of the Court’s primary considerations was that 
courts generally allow equitable tolling of habeas corpus appeals.320 By comparison, equi-
table principles traditionally govern substantive tort law and these principles existed well 
                                                          
tolling principles.”). 
 306. Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 233, at 114. See also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 
1191 (2011) (“In approaching this question, we start from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort 
it adopts the background of general tort law.”).  
 307. Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 233, at 115.  
 308. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012).  
 309. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979). 
 310. Arteaga v. United States, 711 F.3d 828, 833 (7th Cir. 2013).  
 311. Neves v. Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 312. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1856 (9th ed. 2009) (“no one can gain advantage by his own wrong”).  
 313. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988). 
 314. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1953).  
 315. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012); Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 209 (1955) (“The policy as well as the letter of 
the law is a guide to decision. Resort to the policy of a law may be had to ameliorate its seeming harshness or to 
qualify its apparent abuses.”); Sisk, supra note 1, at 104-05. 
 316. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 
 317. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)-(2) (1996). 
 318. Holland, 560 U.S. at 647. 
 319. Id. at 645-48.  
 320. Id. at 646.  
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before the FTCA’s enactment.321 Thus, ex hypothesi, section 2401(b) fits into an area of 
law “where equity finds a comfortable home.”322  
VII. CONCLUSION 
As this note demonstrates, the Supreme Court’s dual jurisprudential fluctuations ren-
der previous ideas about—and interpretations of—section 2401(b) of little resonance to-
day.323 Former efforts by courts and commentators alike were no doubt driven by the need 
for a uniform approach, and rightly so.324 What this article has in common with recent cases 
and commentary, though, is an aversion to the use of legislative history that, correct or not, 
so thoroughly dominated the traditional approach.325 Pragmatic and evidentiary concerns 
drove this movement, due in large part to the difficulty in deriving an accurate picture of a 
more than fifty-year-old Act with virtually no direct guidance on the issue of equitable 
tolling.326 Recognizing the obviousness of this problem, the Court’s modern focus centers 
on text, context, and purpose as the most readily discernable characteristics of a statute.327 
However, any dissatisfaction with legislative history should not ignore, but instead should 
seek solace in, the general purpose and objectives sought by the Act as a whole. From this 
perspective, the task of interpreting section 2401(b) specifically, and the various provision 
of the FTCA writ large, is simplified. Although this approach employs numerous, and at 
times conflicting approaches to statutory construction, the end goal of a harmonious and 
equitable construction outweighs the problems inherent in the overreliance on rigidity that 
plagued previous efforts.  
Finally, and most importantly, the argument that section 2401(b) is not jurisdictional 
only reaches its gestalt with the simultaneous examination of the Court’s prevailing ap-
proach to Irwin, sovereign immunity, and jurisdictional rules.328 This article’s niche is 
found in combining these developments and applying them to section 2401(b), meanwhile 
coalescing lower court arguments in support of the propriety of applying equitable tolling 
to the FTCA.329 When bolstered by normative and pragmatic concerns, the rationale for 
this argument appears compelling.330 Concerns that the systematic application of equitable 
                                                          
 321. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1946); Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 
U.S. 435, 446-47 (1918); Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 348 (1875); Sherwood v. Sutton, 21 F. Cas. 1303, 1304-
05 (No. 12,782) (C.C.D.N.H. 1828); Jones v. Conoway, 4 Yeates 109 (Pa. 1804). 
 322. Holland, 560 U.S. at 647 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)).  
 323. See e.g., Powers v. United States, 390 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1968); Frey v. Woodard, 481 F. Supp. 1152 
(E.D. Pa. 1979). 
 324. See e.g., Elana Wexler, Note, Section 2401(b) Reconfigured: Irwin v. Dep’t. of Veterans Affairs Leads to 
the Right Result for the Wrong Reasons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2927 (2006).  
 325. Colella & Bain, supra note 16.  
 326. KENT GREENWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 37-38 (2013).  
 327. Sisk, supra note 8, at 605.  
 328. GREENWALT, supra note 326, at 41-42: 
A shift in a provision’s content might also occur if a court relies on the general purpose 
behind a law to alter the interpretation of the meaning of a specific provision whose content 
is unclear. In this instance, a later court might decide that the meaning of a specific provi-
sion was correctly understood by an earlier court in one way, but that, given new legal 
developments or changed conditions, it should now understand the meaning in a different 
way, in order to better serve the clear underlying purpose.   
Id.  
 329. Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 
189 (3d Cir. 2009); Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 1999).  
 330. Arteaga v. United States, 711 F.3d 828, 834-35 (7th Cir. 2013).  
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tolling will likely overburden the judicial system are at odds with and should bow to the 
general purpose of the Act, particularly in light of prevailing views about sovereign im-
munity.331 Claimants must still bear the burden of proving equitable tolling applies to their 
claim, whereas the government, as a defendant, retains the ability to plead the statute of 
limitations as a defense.332 The systematic adoption of this approach, either uniformly 
among the circuits, or by the Supreme Court itself, provides the predictability and uni-
formity necessary for a remedial mechanist as important as the FTCA, meanwhile avoiding 
additions to the already dense array of technical requirements the Act imposes.333 
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 331. See John S. Gannon, Federal Tort Claims Act—Seeking Redress Against the Sovereign: Balancing the 
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